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Abstract. We estimate the size and trend of the Egyptian shadow economy using two of the 
most commonly used methods: the currency demand approach and the structural equation 
MIMIC model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to estimate an index of 
the size of the shadow economy in Egypt during the last four decades (1976 to 2013). We 
address the long term association between the variables, relax the assumption of 
multivariate normality and demonstrate different scenarios of constraining the reference 
variable in the MIMIC model. In addition to the standard explanatory variables used in the 
literature, we consider variables that are specifically related to the Egyptian economy such 
as self-employment, agricultural importance and a proxy for institutional quality of 
democratic institutions. Our results indicate a decreasing trend of the size of the shadow 
economy, yet it still has a huge weight on the official GDP for a developing country like 
Egypt leading to some negative externalities and thus hindering the development of the 
country. 
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1. Introduction 
ost countries around the world have sizeable shadow economies, 
particularly in the developing world. The shadow economy has diverse 
effects on the country‟s social and economic life which threaten the 
country‟s stability and growth prospects. The shadow economy creates a vicious 
cycle of continuous increase in taxes, absorbs human capital and resources from 
the formal economy and leads to distortions in official statistics hindering the 
success of official policies. (Schneider & Enste, 2013; Dell‟Anno, 2007). However, 
the shadow economy is not necessarily seen as an enemy to the overall economy. 
The shadow economy can act as an employer of last resort, create markets that 
otherwise not possible adding to the dynamics of the formal economy and can have 
positive stimulating effects. Given this complexity of our unobserved economy, 
general interest in understanding the nature of the shadow economy increased 
throughout the years.  
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For the case of a developing country like Egypt, this is the first study to analyze 
the shadow economy generally and to estimate its size particularly. Our study, to 
the best of our knowledge, is the first study to provide a time series index of the 
size of the Egyptian shadow economy. On one side, the contribution of the paper is 
to understand the development of the size of the shadow economy. On the other 
side, our time series index adds to the literature of shadow economy by allowing 
further analysis of the different aspects of informality in Egypt. Hence, our annual 
estimates of the size of the shadow economy is the first step closer to understand 
the development of the unexplored existence of the shadow economy in Egypt. 
Since that there are neither direct measures (survey analysis) nor econometric 
estimates of the size of the shadow economy in Egypt, then the failure of the 
government policiesi to promote growth and stability can be highly attributed to the 
lack of knowledge about the size of the Egyptian shadow economy.   
Egypt is an interesting case to focus on given its highly strategic location in the 
MENA region and given the recent events that occurred in the region. In the 
aftermath of the 2011 revolution, policy makers are working with economic 
planners to execute major reforms to promote economic development and stabilize 
the political system in Egypt. Amongst the objectives of these reforms is tackling 
the shadow economy. However, the government efforts to tackle informality and 
other legal measures are limited. Their approach is either to evacuate street vendors 
by brutal police force or to intensify regulations by increasing jail times from 1 
month to 3 months and penalties from 1000 LE to 5000 LE (112 to 560 US dollars) 
for involvement in informal economic activities (FEDA, 2009). Needless to say, 
these efforts have backfired by rising instability. Not only that, but also the more 
recent initiatives to license street vendors have failed to regulate the shadow 
economy. Therefore, knowledge on the size and the main causes of the Egyptian 
shadow economy becomes essential for policymakers to have a coherent plan of 
reforms and policies to formalize the shadow economy in order to be able to restore 
fiscal stability and drive economic growth. Until today not much research has been 
done to analyze and econometrically estimate the Egyptian shadow economy over 
a long period of time.  
The present study adds to the literature an understanding of the evolution of the 
shadow economy in Egypt from 1976 to 2013. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first comprehensive study to apply the Currency Demand Approach as well as 
the MIMIC model to estimate the size of the shadow economy in Egypt. A few 
studies, which are shown in Table-1, investigating the shadow economies around 
the world have also included Egypt. They show a wide range of the size of the 
Egyptian shadow economy. Yet, these studies were done using a general cross 
section analysis for shorter periods of time. Additionally, they do not take into 
account the specific social, economic and political structures that significantly 
influence the Egyptian shadow and official economy.  
Our paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we present the MIMIC and 
CDA models as well as our results. In section 3, an analysis of the shadow 
economy and policy implications are undertaken. In section 4, we critically outline 
the challenges of modelling the unobserved shadow economy. Finally, a conclusion 
is provided.  
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Table 1. Previous estimates of the Egyptian shadow economy 
Author(s) Method SE % of GDP 
Schneider & Enste (2000) (Table 4 page 100). 
Lacko (1996) (Table 18)  
 
Physical Input Method Average 1989-
1999:68% 
Schneider (2005) (Table 2 page 118) Dynamic Panel MIMIC 
model 
2000:35.1% 
CDA 2002:36%-
2003:36.9%,  
Schneider et al. (2010) (Table 3.3.2 page 23) Dynamic Panel MIMIC 
model 
1999:35.4%-
2006:36.7% 
Alm & Embaye (2013) (Appendix page 534) Dynamic Panel CDA 1984:48.7%-
2006:30.4% 
Notes: Source: see column 1 “Author(s)” 
 
2. Modelling the Egyptian Shadow Economy 
It is important to define the shadow economy that shall be estimated by the 
models. Although many studies attempted to investigate the shadow economy but 
reaching a unified definition is still an unresolved issue. For the purpose of this 
study, the adopted definition is that the shadow economy involves all currently 
unrecorded economic (market-based) activities which, if registered, would 
contribute to the officially calculated national income (GDP). Since the focus of 
this paper is on the productive economic activities that are usually included in the 
national accounts, this definition excludes illegal activities such as criminal 
activities, human trafficking, or smuggling. Also, undeclared activities such as 
charitable, household or Do-it-Yourself activities are excluded (Schneider et al., 
2010). Given the fact that illegal and undeclared activities are not accounted for in 
the national accounts statistics and since that our focus is on the development of an 
economy that is distorted by the shadow economy. Thus, we direct our attention to 
the macroeconomic variables leading to the proliferation of the shadow economy in 
Egypt.  
In the literature there are various methods to measure the extent of the shadow 
economy over time, yet it is still a difficult task because the shadow economy is 
untraceable and unrecorded. Those methods are divided into direct, indirect and 
model approachesii. Due to the complex nature of the shadow economy and since 
there is no consensus in the literature on which method is better, we apply two of 
the most widely used methods to estimate the shadow economy in Egypt. The first 
one is based on the Structural Equation Model known as the Multiple Indicator 
Multiple Causes (MIMIC) Model. The second method is the Currency Demand 
Approach (CDA). 
2.1. Structural Equation (MIMIC) model 
The MIMIC model is a special type of structural equation modelling (SEM) 
based on the statistical theory of unobserved variables. The MIMIC model is a 
theory-based approachiii to confirm the influence of a set of exogenous causal 
variables on the latent variable (shadow economy), and also the effect of the 
shadow economy on macroeconomic indicator variables (Farzanegan, 2009). 
Therefore, the MIMIC model is rather a confirmatory than explanatory method 
(Schneider et al., 2010).  The hypothesized path of the relationships between the 
observed variables and the latent shadow economy based on our theoretical 
considerations is being visualized in graph (A.1) in the appendix. 
Formally, the MIMIC model has two parts: the structural model and the 
measurement model
iv
. The structural model shows that the latent variable 𝜂  is 
linearly determined by a set of exogenous causal variables which can be illustrated 
as follows: 
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𝜂 = 𝛾′𝜒 +  𝜍        (1) 
 
where χ is a vector of causal variables, γis a vector of scalars, η is the latent 
variable (shadow economy) and ς is a structural disturbance term.  
The measurement model which links the shadow economy with the set of 
selected indicators is specified by: 
 
𝑦 = 𝜆𝜂 + 𝜀          (2) 
 
where y is a vector of indicator variables, λ is a vector of loading factors to 
represent the magnitude of the expected change for a unit change in the latent 
variable η. The ε is the measurement error term. 
First of all, it is important to establish a well-grounded economic theoretical 
model explaining the expected relationship between the latent variable and the 
observed variables. The MIMIC model tests this economic theory and confirms the 
hypothesized relationships between the latent variable 𝜂 (shadow economy) and its 
causes and indicators by examining the consistency of the actual data with the 
hypothesized relationships. The Maximum Likelihood method (ML) shall be 
applied to estimate the parameters of the MIMIC model. Then, the time series 
index of the Egyptian shadow economy is calculated.  This time series MIMIC 
index based on equation (1) is calculated by multiplying the coefficients of the 
significant causal variables with the respective time series. The MIMIC model 
produces only an index of the trend of the size of the shadow economy, thus an 
additional step is required to calibrate this index in order to calculate the size of the 
shadow economy as percentage of GDP. This step is called the benchmarking step
v
 
which requires an exogenous estimate of the size of the shadow economy at a 
certain point, preferably by another estimation method. Given the fact that there are 
no survey analyses and estimates on the shadow economy, we calibrate the MIMIC 
index by applying the CDA.  
It is important to note that in the MIMIC model estimation, we need to fix an 
indicator variable in the measurement equation (2) (Bollen, 1989). This is required 
in order to have a reference variable to set a measurement scale for the shadow 
economy because it is, by nature, unobserved. 
The MIMIC approach considers various causes that influence the development 
of the shadow economy and also considers multiple traces over time. There is a 
large body of literature providing a theoretical explanation of the causal and 
indicator variables, which directly influence the size and development of the 
shadow economy over time. However, those variables differ from country to 
country. For the case of Egypt, the causal variables are discussed in the following 
section.  
2.1.1. Causal variables 
i. Tax burden 
The most widely accepted and important cause affecting the size of the shadow 
economy is the tax burden. Numerous empirical studies confirm a statistically 
significant effect of the tax burden on the shadow economy. Among others are 
Schneider (2010) for 21 OECD countries, Tanzi (1999), Alanon & Go‟mez (2005) 
for the Spanish shadow economy and Buehn (2012).  
The tax burden is of major interest to economists because taxes influence the 
labor-leisure choices and stimulate labor supply in the shadow economy. The 
higher the difference between total costs of labor in the formal economy and net 
income, the stronger the incentives to operate in the shadow economy in order to 
evade paying those taxes (Loayza, 1996; Schneider, 2005). Additionally, the tax 
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burden increases the production costs of goods and services which increase their 
price in the formal market. Therefore, firms operating in developing countries like 
Egypt have higher incentives to engage in informal activities in order to evade 
taxes and to reduce production costs to be able to sell their products at lower prices 
given the competition in the shadow and official economy. Moreover, the 
government burden the people with high tax rates to finance its activities and its 
debt. Tax revenues are a major source of finance to the government to the extent 
that the weight of tax revenues is on average more than 60% of total revenues. In 
the econometric analysis, the tax burden is measured by the share of total tax 
burden to GDP.  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the tax burden, the larger the size of the shadow 
economy is, ceteris paribus.  
ii. Institutional quality of democratic institutions 
It is quite important to analyze the effect of the quality of public institutions on 
the size and development of the shadow economy. Good rule of law, by securing 
property rights and enforceability of contracts, increases the benefits to remain in 
the official economy and increases the costs of informality. On the other hand, 
corruption of bureaucracy and public servants along with a weak rule of law are 
associated with large shadow economies (Schneider, 2010).   
Various authors have studied the quality of public institutions as a determining 
variable of the shadow economy. Based on a study of 21 OECD countries, 
Schneider (2010) found out that the quality of institutions is statistically significant 
affecting people‟s incentives to operate in the shadow economy. Razmi et al. 
(2013) also concluded a statistically negative relationship between the quality of 
institutions and the size of the underground economy in OIC countries.  
As an approximation of institutional quality, we use a variable measuring the 
quality of democratic institutions, namely the Polity IV index. Recent studies by 
various scholars highlighted the negative relationship between democracy and the 
size of the shadow economy. Teobaldelli & Schneider (2013) confirmed a negative 
relationship between democracy and the size of the shadow economy. Also, 
Solomon & Schrestha (2014) concluded that a high degree of democracy reduced 
the informal economy in Nepal by 10%. In many developing countries mistrust in 
the government and inadequate democratic institutions providing poor and 
inefficient public goods and services influence people‟s incentives to operate in the 
shadow economy (Petersen et al., 2010). 
To capture this effect, the PolityIV index is used as a proxy of the quality of 
democratic institutions. The PolityIV index ranges from -10 to +10, representing 
autocratic to democratic states, respectively. Hence, the higher the score, the better 
is the quality of institutions representing the extent of democratic institutions in a 
country. We expect a negative sign associated with this variable.  
Hypothesis 2: The better the quality of democratic institutions, the smaller the 
size of the shadow economy is, ceteris paribus.  
iii. Size of the agricultural sector 
The importance of the agricultural sector plays a significant role in affecting the 
size and development of the shadow economy. Vuletin (2008) concluded that the 
dominance of the agricultural sector has a significant effect on the size of the 
shadow economy in Latin America and the Caribbean. Similarly, almost 45% of 
the agricultural sector in Jamaica is conducted informally (Wedderburn et al., 
2011). Also, countries like Yemen and Morocco have high levels of informality 
due to the large share of agricultural employment relative to total employment 
(Angel-Urdinola & Tanabe, 2012). It is argued that informality is segmented by 
sectors with clear dominance of the agricultural and related sectors. The reason 
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behind the concentration of informal work in the agricultural sector is the weak 
control and governance capacity of the local government, especially in rural areas 
which in return creates the perfect environments for shadow economic activities. 
The agricultural sector is difficult to regulate which indicates that the higher the 
importance of this sector, the larger is the shadow economy (Vuletin, 2008).  
In many studies, agriculture is excluded from the measurement of the size of the 
shadow economy. However, the majority of informal employment and work can be 
concentrated in agriculture, especially for developing countries (Chen, 2007). 
Therefore, for the first time we include this variable as a causal factor of the 
shadow economy which is highly relevant to the case of Egypt since the 
agricultural sector plays a significant role in the Egyptian economy. Egypt has an 
agricultural sector based on its climate, landscape and geographical location on the 
river Nile. Using statistics, agricultural employment in Egypt is larger compared to 
employment in the industrial sector. In 1980, employment in agriculture reached 
42% compared to 20% employment in the industrial sector. The share of 
agricultural employment continued to be larger throughout the years, reaching in 
1994 38% compared to 22% in industry, 32% in 2007 compared to 22% and 30% 
in 2011 compared to 24% in the industrial sector. In the MIMIC model the 
agricultural value-added as % of GDP is used to reflect the importance of the 
agricultural sector in Egypt.  
Hypothesis 3: The more dominant the agriculture sector, the larger the size of 
the shadow economy is, ceteris paribus. 
iv. Unemployment rate  
Despite a large literature, the causal relationship between unemployment and 
the shadow economy is still ambiguous. The widely accepted hypothesis is that an 
increase in unemployment leads to an increase in shadow economy activities 
because unemployed people have a strong incentive to find jobs in the informal 
economy. Thus, the expected sign for the effect of unemployment on the shadow 
economy is positive. Schneider et al. (2010) concluded that the unemployment rate 
plays a significant role in affecting the size of the shadow economies in Transition 
countries as well as in the High Income OECD countries. The same conclusion had 
been made by Dell‟Anno et al. (2007) for the cases of Spain, Greece and France.  
However, it is counter argued that the availability of informal jobs becomes limited 
when there is a contraction in the overall economy and when unemployment 
remains very high, because the availability of jobs, either formal or informal, 
decreases. Based on their findings, Alanon & Go‟mez-Antonio (2005) as well as 
Macias & Cazzavillan (2010) concluded that the unemployment rate is a significant 
factor that negatively influences the size and development of the shadow economy 
in Spain and Mexico, respectively. Also, Buehn & Schneider (2008) concluded that 
unemployment, in the long run, has a negative effect on the French shadow 
economy. With reference to the overwhelming evidence, we argue that there is a 
positive relationship between unemployment and the shadow economy. 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the unemployment, the larger the size of the shadow 
economy is, ceteris paribus. 
v. Self-Employment  
As another independent variable we added the self-employment quota as causal 
factor affecting the development of the shadow economy in Egypt. With reference 
to the literature, the rate of self-employment as a percentage of the labour force in 
the official economy is regarded as a cause of the shadow economy. The theoretical 
assumption is that the self-employed are highly motivated to avoid complying with 
tax regulations because they have a great number of legal and “illegal” tax 
deductions. Also, they enjoy direct business relationships with the customers, 
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which allows them to bargain with their customers to reach a “tax saving” 
agreement. Last, the self-employed are more inclined to employ irregular and 
informal employees because they have fewer and lesser auditing controls relative 
to bigger and formal organizations. Given the economic status in Egypt, in which 
the private sector grew only by 5% in 12 years, and the abundance of labor, the 
formal economy can‟t absorb the increasing number of the self-employed which 
“drives” them to turn to the shadow economy. Therefore, the expected sign of this 
variable is a positive sign. Studies by Dell‟Anno et al. (2007) and Tedds (2005) 
found evidence to support the positive relationship between self-employment and 
the shadow economy.  
Hypothesis 5: The higher the self-employment rate, the larger the size of the 
shadow economy is, ceteris paribus. 
2.1.2. Indicators 
After considering various causes influencing the size of the Egyptian shadow 
economy, the MIMIC model requires the selection of different indicators that 
reflect the existence of the shadow economy.   
i.Real GDP (index, base year 2005=100) 
According to the literature (see below), the relationship between the shadow 
economy and the official economy is still ambiguous.  On one hand, the correlation 
between the shadow economy and the official economy is positive, while on the 
other hand it is found to be negative.   
Several scholars including Schneider et al. (2010) for 114 countries, Loayza 
(1996) for 14 Latin American counties, Buehn & Schneider (2008), Schneider & 
Williams (2013), Buehn & Farzanegan (2012) as well as Dell‟Anno et al. (2007) 
for France, Greece and Spain have concluded that there is a negative relationship 
between the size of the shadow economy and the official one. An increase in the 
size of the shadow economy leads to a decrease in the official economy because 
productive resources and factors are absorbed by the shadow economy creating a 
depressing effect on the growth of the official economy (Schneider & Enste, 2013; 
Alanon & Go‟mez-Antonio, 2005).   
However, other scholars argued that there is a positive relationship between the 
growth of the shadow economy and the official economy. The shadow economy 
might allow poor people to find ways to produce and sell cheap products as a way 
of generating income. Hence, it is argued that the shadow economy grows along 
with the expansion in economic activities because the increased demand in the 
formal economy spills over into the informal economy leading to greater 
competitiveness and entrepreneurship. Based on their findings for Asian countries 
Schneider et al. (2003) concluded that there is a positive relationship between the 
growth in the shadow economy and the official economy. It is important to note 
that either way, the relationship between the shadow economy and the official one 
is not linear, yet the researchers must take care of the level of the development of 
the country at hand. Schneider (2005) argued that the relationship is negative for 
the case of developing, while it is positive for the case of developed and transition 
countries. 
In our MIMIC model, the real GDP index (base year 2005=100) is used as an 
indicator to reflect the existence of the shadow economy in Egypt and to test the 
relationship between the shadow and the official economy. Since the shadow 
economy is not directly measured (latent variable), we will set the real GDP index 
as our reference variable and it is expected to have a negative sign. The value of 
the variable is fixed to -1 throughout the different model specifications. 
Hypothesis 6: The larger the size of the shadow economy, the lower the GDP is, 
ceteris paribus. 
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ii. Money in the hands of the public  
Irregular and informal transactions are highly expected to be conducted mostly 
in cash rather than with credit/debit cards, checks or bank transactions in order to 
avoid detection by auditing controls and government officials. According to the 
Central Bank of Egypt, money supply increased as a result of an increase in the 
currency in circulation outside the banking system which rose by 24.2% in 2013 
compared to 15.6% a year earlier and to 8.7% in 2009. Studies by various scholars 
such as Alanon & Go´mez-Antonio (2005), Buehn (2012), Dell‟Anno et al. (2007), 
and Schneider et al. (2010) concluded that there is a significant and positive 
relationship between size of the shadow economy and currency held by the public. 
Therefore, in the MIMIC model, money growth is used as an indicator. 
Hypothesis 7: The larger the size of the shadow economy, the larger the money 
held by the public is, ceteris paribus 
iii. Total employment 
The third indicator considered in the MIMIC model is total employment as a 
share of the total population. The shadow economy absorbs the economic agents 
from the formal (“official”) economy to work informally leading to a reduction in 
the availability of human resources in the formal economy. Several authors, 
including Bajada & Schneider (2005), Dell‟Anno et al. (2007) and Schneider et al. 
(2010), included the total labor force participation rate as an indicator of the 
increased informal activity reflected in the reduction of the labor force rate. 
However, the general definition of the labor force rate includes the total workforce 
legible and willing to work; hence employed and unemployed. Thus, we argue that 
focusing only on total employment gives us a more precise indicator of the shadow 
economy due to the movement of the economic agents to participate in informal 
activities. The existence of a relatively large shadow economy in Egypt might lead 
to the transfer of labour from the formal economy to the shadow economy.   
Hypothesis 8:  the larger the shadow economy, the lower total employment is, 
ceteris paribus. 
To summarize, further causal and indicator variables have been used to estimate 
the size of the shadow economy around the globe
vi
. Those variables include labor 
force statistics (working hours, salaries and wages), government subsidies, social 
security contributions, or disposable income. Due to a lack of information for the 
period of our study (1976 to 2013) and for the case of Egypt, such variables were 
not included in the MIMIC model.  
2.1.3. Estimation of the MIMIC model 
For the case of Egypt, we use annual data from 1976 to 2013 for  
(1) the share of total taxes in GDP,  
(2) the polity IV index as a proxy for institutional quality,  
(3) agricultural value-added as % of GDP,  
(4) the unemployment rate and  
(5) the self-employment rate  
as the major causal variables affecting the size of the shadow economy in 
Egypt. In order to reflect the shadow economy activities, we use  
(1) the real GDP index,  
(2) currency outside the banking system and  
(3) total employment as percentage of the total population  
as indicators in our MIMIC model
vii.
 
Before we conducted the MIMIC estimation, we tested our time series for unit 
root and co-integration. All of our time-series are non-stationary
viii
, and they are co-
integrated of order I=1. Based on the Johannsen Cointegration test, the Trace test 
indicates 4 cointegrating equations, and also the Max Eigen-value test indicates 1 
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cointegrating equation. Therefore, we use the time-series at levels in order not to 
lose the long-run association between the variables and to be able to estimate a 
long-run MIMIC model. Additionally, there are some assumptions that are violated 
by our time series. Firstly, based on the Mardia‟s normality testix, the assumption of 
multi-variate normality is violated. Secondly, the sample size is not large enough 
(n=38) which strongly influences the chi-square statistic
x
. In return, we used 
certain options in STATA 14 module in order to accommodate for these violations. 
In order to be able to relax the assumption of multi-variate normality, we used the 
Satorra-Bentler as a special option with the ML estimation to improve the chi-
square statistic of goodness of fit in case of non-normal time-series (Satorra & 
Bentler, 1994). The Satorra-Bentler gives us the same parameters as the default ML 
estimation. Since the chi-square fit statistic is highly influenced by the sample size, 
we used the Swain scaling factor in the STATA 14 software to correct for the chi-
square statistic in small samples and complex models.  
Four different specifications of the MIMIC results are presented in Table- 2. 
Different specifications have been estimated in order to capture the magnitude and 
the effect of different causal variables on the size of the shadow economy. In 
specification 1, we start with a general specification including all the causal 
variables. While in specifications 2 and 3, we remove the insignificant variables in 
order to determine the most important variables that lead to the existence of the 
shadow economy in Egypt. In the last specification, we focus on the effect of total 
taxes along with other causal variables including agricultural importance and 
institutional quality. 
Since that the shadow economy is a latent variable, then it is important to define 
a unit of measurement which is as percentage of GDP in order to have a 
meaningful interpretation of the how big the size of the shadow economy is. As 
being aforementioned, we fix the real GDP index to -1 along all MIMIC 
specifications. The choice of the sign of the reference variable is not arbitrary. 
There must be a theoretical logic behind choosing the reference indicator and its 
associated sign.  The strategy to determine the sign of the coefficient of the 
reference variable is called ‚reductio ad absurdum‟ which is affected by theoretical 
assumptions.  The importance of fixing this variable is to have unit of measurement 
to estimate the other variables as a function of this scale variable and to make the 
estimated coefficients more comparable (Dell‟Anno et al., 2007). In our 
estimations, the reference variable is Real GDP index and is set to a value of -1.  
To confirm that the associated sign (-1) of our reference variable in our MIMIC 
specifications is the correct sign, we have replicated the MIMIC specifications in 
Table- 2 while fixing the reference indicator (Real GDP index) to +1 and also 
relaxing our reference variable and constraining Money_Growth to +1
xi
. Firstly, we 
fix the reference indicator (Real GDP index) to +1. As a result, the signs of the 
causal coefficients change while keeping the same absolute values and significance 
levels. At this point, we, as researchers, have to make sure whether these signs are 
theoretically accepted and whether they agree with the empirical evidence in the 
literature of the shadow economy or not. Thus, the choice of normalizing the Real 
GDP index to -1 or +1 is based ontheoretical assumptions of the observed 
variables. In the specifications mentioned in Table-2, if we normalize the reference 
variable to +1, the signs of the observed causal variables change to be against the 
most widely accepted theoretical and empirical evidence in the literature of the 
shadow economy. This confirms that the choice of -1 is the right sign of the 
reference variable. Especially that it is rational to expect that the shadow economy 
absorbs human capital and resources from the official economy leading to negative 
externalities.  
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Instead of constraining Real GDP index to -1 as being our reference indicator, 
we further conducted another estimation while normalizing Money_Growth to +1 
and leaving Real GDP index unconstrained in all the MIMIC specifications 
summarized in Table-2. Based on the outcomes, we confirm that the MIMIC 
results are robust when we fix the Money_Growth to +1 because the observed 
variables keep the same signs, coefficient values and significance levels. But for 
interpretation reasons, we normalize the Real GDP index to -1 as being our 
reference indicator to provide a meaningful interpretation of the shadow economy 
i.e. as % of GDP. 
To summarize the MIMIC results, we can conclude that the causal variables 
behave as expected based on our theoretical considerations except for the 
unemployment rate and self-employment rate, which turned to be insignificant 
causes of the Egyptian shadow economy. The main driving factors of the shadow 
economy in Egypt are the tax burden, institutional quality measured by the polity 
index and the importance of the agricultural sector. 
 
Table 3.MIMIC estimation of the size of the shadow economy from 1976 to 2013, yearly 
data 
Variables/specifications MIMIC1 
5-1-3 
MIMIC2 
4-1-3 
MIMIC3 
4-1-3 
MIMIC4 
3-1-3 
Causes     
Total Tax Burden 
 
0.26*** 
(3.99) 
0.29*** 
(6.38) 
0.28*** 
(3.76) 
0.33*** 
(8.54) 
Institutional Quality -0.48*** 
(-9.01) 
-0.46*** 
(-9.34) 
-0.48*** 
(-8.94) 
-0.46*** 
(-9.29) 
Agriculture Importance 
 
0.26* 
(1.75) 
0.35*** 
(2.67) 
0.33*** 
(2.44) 
0.46*** 
(7.48) 
Unemployment Rate  
 
-0.10 
 (-0.70) 
-0.13 
(-0.94) 
  
Self Employment 0.15 
(1.07) 
 0.17 
(1.17) 
 
Indicators 
Real GDP Index -1 -1 -1 -1 
Money 
 
0.66*** 
(13.01) 
0.65*** 
(11.38) 
0.67*** 
(13.43) 
0.65*** 
(11.65) 
Total Employment -0.86*** 
(-14.28) 
-0.81*** 
(-14.51) 
-0.82*** 
(´14.27) 
-0.82*** 
(-14.54) 
Statistical tests 
Chi2 
Pvalue 
25.98 
(0.0038) 
14.63 
(0.0668) 
22.93 
(0.0035) 
11.55 
(0.0728) 
Swain corrected chi2 
Pvalue 
GFI 
AGFI 
23.44 
(0.0092) 
0.87 
0.94 
13.37 
(0.0996) 
0.93 
0.97 
25.59 
(0.0012) 
0.90 
0.97 
10.69 
(0.0983) 
0.95 
0.99 
CFI 0.911 0.961 0.917 0.967 
SRMR 0.053 0.050 0.058 0.053 
CD 
Degrees of freedom 
0.986 
35 
0.973 
27 
0.987 
27 
0.973 
20 
Notes: Absolute z-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% 
significance levels. 1The statistical test reflecting the quality of models (2 and3) are highly acceptable. 
Goodness of fit index (GFI): values closer to 0.90 reflect a perfect fit. Adjusted GFI: GFI corrected 
for degrees of freedom. CFI: when the comparative fit index is closer to one, it indicates a good 
model fit. SRMR: The values less than 0.08 indicate a good model fit. Coefficient of Determination 
(CD): A perfect fit corresponds to a CD=1 (Kline, 2011). Degrees of freedom=0.5(p+q)(p+q+1)-t, 
where p:number of causes, q=number of indicators, t=number of free parameters.Source: Own 
calculations 
 
Based on the MIMIC specification (MIMIC4), we are able to calculate the size 
of the shadow economy in Egypt from 1976 to 2013
xii
 and to visualize the trend 
and development of the shadow economy as being shown in graph 1. The trend of 
the shadow economy is decreasing from 35% of official GDP in 1976 to 21% in 
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2013. On average, the size of the shadow economy based on the MIMIC model 
during the period under study is equal to 30% of GDP.  
 
Graph 1. Size and development of the Egyptian shadow economy using the MIMIC model, 
in % of GDP. 
Source: Own Calculations 
 
2.2. The Currency Demand Approach 
2.2.1. Currency Demand Model 
The second method applied to estimate the size of the shadow economy is the 
currency demand approach (CDA) which is one of the most widely-used
xiii
 indirect 
methods.  The CDA is a monetary approach, mostly referred to as the indicator 
approach, which measures the discrepancy between the declared/official income 
and the income covered by the currency demand. The CDA is a macroeconomic 
approach, too, that uses various variables containing information on the 
development of the shadow economy over time. The CDA is different from the 
MIMIC model in the way that the former measures the shadow economy indirectly 
by focusing on traces that the shadow economy leaves in official statistics, while 
the latter deals with the shadow economy as a latent variable that is directly 
influenced by different observable variables. 
The pioneers to apply this method were Cagan (1958) for the case of the United 
States followed by Gutmann (1977) and Feige (1979). Tanzi (1983) further 
developed this approach by assuming that the tax burden is one of the core causes 
of the shadow economy which is then channeled through the excessive demand and 
use of cash. The main assumption of the CDA is that informal transactions 
conducted in the shadow economy are mainly in cash in order to avoid any trace of 
evidence for the official authorities. Any excess demand of cash is then attributed 
to the variables controlling for the shadow economy. In that sense, an increase in 
the informal activities in an economy would lead to an excessive use of cash. 
Therefore, if we can estimate the amount of excessive cash used in the informal 
activities, then we can estimate the size of the shadow economy by multiplying the 
amount of cash used in the shadow economy by the income velocity of currency.  
Formally, there are two steps when estimating the size of the shadow economy 
by the CDA. The first step is estimating the demand for currency, both for the 
formal transactions in an economy and also for the informal ones involving the 
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motivation to cover up income. Following the typical Cagan (1958) currency 
demand function,  
 
𝐶0 = 𝑎(1 + 𝛩)
𝛼𝑌0
𝛽
exp −𝛾𝑖       (3) 
 
where C0 is observed cash and Θ represents the incentive variable that motivates 
individuals to conduct informal activities which can be approximated by the tax 
burden or the intensity of government regulation. This variable is the key variable 
in the CDA because an increase in Θ is expected to have a positive impact on 
currency demand because people are highly motivated to participate in the shadow 
economy, hence demanding more cash for their informal transactions. Y0 is the 
official real GDP which represents the level of transactions in an economy. i is the 
interest rate or inflation rate representing the opportunity cost of holding cash. 
Finally, the A, α, β, and γ are the parameters.  
From equation (3), we are able to estimateĈ which isthe amount of currency 
demand in both economies, the formal and shadow economies. Then, when we set 
the incentive variable (Θ) to the minimum values, we are able to obtain Ć. The 
difference between Ĉ and Ć gives us the extra currency in an economy, i.e. the 
illegal money used in the shadow economy to conduct informal transactions. By 
multiplying the extra currency by the income velocity of currency, we are able to 
estimate the size of the shadow economy.  
2.2.2 Estimation of the CDA  
For the case of Egypt, we use annual data series to cover the period from 1976 
to 2013
xiv
. In order to capture the long-run effect of the explanatory variables on 
currency demand, we model the following specification: 
 
Ct = β0 + β1Yt + β2 1 + TAXt + β3REGt + β4SELFt + β5Rt + εt (4) 
 
where Ct is the natural logarithm of currency in circulation outside the banking 
system normalized by the GDP deflator, Yt is the natural logarithm of real income 
(GDP), TAXt is the natural logarithm of total tax revenues normalized by real 
GDP, REGt is approximated by public employment in relation to total labour force 
as being our regulatory indicator in the model, SELFt corresponds to the ratio of 
self-employment to labour force, and Rt is the natural logarithm of the nominal 
deposit interest rate representing the opportunity cost of holding money. εt is the 
error term.  
In addition to the typical independent macro-economic variables (tax burden 
and regulation intensity measured as the share of public employees in % of total 
employment) related to the size of the shadow economy, we added self-
employment as a percentage of total labour force as an additional variable to 
capture the incentives of people participating in the shadow economy and thus 
increasing the demand for currency
xv
. Egypt is characterized as being a labor-
abundant country with an increasing population. The new phase of industrialization 
since the 1952 revolution focused solely on the capital intensive industries rather 
than on the labor intensive industries which in return did not create more 
employment opportunities neither in the public nor in the private sector which then 
pushed people to seek self-employment opportunities. Not only that, but also the 
entry regulation in Egypt is burdensome. Based on a study by Djankov et al. 
(2002), they concluded that a new entrant to the market in Egypt must at least go 
through 11 procedures at governmental agencies and wait at least 51 business days 
to obtain a legal status to operate a business. Due to the bureaucratic environment 
compared to other countries
xvi
, entrepreneurs are motivated to be self-employed 
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and operate informally. We expect that income, taxes, public employment and self-
employment have a positive impact on currency demand while we expect a 
negative impact of interest rates on currency; encouraging individuals to avoid 
excessive holdings of currency as the opportunity cost of holding cash increases.  
Before starting with the estimation of equation (4), we tested our time series for 
the presence of unit root and cointegration. Based on the results of the unit root test 
from the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test
xvii
, the time series are strongly non-
stationary at level but when taking the first differences, the time series become 
stationary. Since the variables are all integrated of the same order I(1), we further 
test for cointegration based on the Johansen Cointegration test. Before running the 
Johansen Cointegration test, we determined the optimal lag length estimating a 
VAR model using the raw data. The optimal lag length is 1 according to LR, FPE, 
CS and HQ. With reference to the Johansen Cointegration test, the trace test 
indicates 2 cointegrating equations at the 5% and the max-eigenvalue test shows 1 
cointegrating equation at the 5%. We can then conclude that at least 1 cointegrating 
relationship exists between the variables in the long-run. Given these results, the 
non-stationarity of the time series and the presence of a long term association 
between the variables allow us to estimate the currency demand based on our 
specification and measure the size of the shadow economy by using the vector 
error correction model (VECM). This type of VEC model is superior to the 
standard estimation methods because it allows us to capture the short- and the long-
run effects. Several authors, including but not limited to Macias & Cazzavillan 
(2009) and Hernadez (2009), have used the VEC currency demand model to 
estimate the size of shadow economy.   
As being expected, in model (1), as in Table-3, which corresponds to our 
specified model in equation (4), the coefficients for income, total tax burden, 
intensity of regulation and self-employment have a positive and strongly significant 
long-run effect on currency demand. Also, as expected, interest rates have a 
significant reducing effect on currency demand.  It is important to note that an 
approximation of currency complements such as the usage of debit/credit cards or 
an approximation of bank transactions were not controlled for in the CDA 
specification due to data limitations. 
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Table 3.Estimating the currency demand from 1976 to 2013, yearly  
Independent variables  (1) 
Ct-1 (real currency outside banks)  1.00 
Yt-1 (real income)  1.46*** 
(0.056) 
[25.49] 
TAX t-1 (total tax burden)   0.67*** 
(0.093) 
[7.25] 
R t-1 (interest rate)  -0.15** 
(-0.056) 
[-2.66] 
REG t-1 (public employmnet)  0.04*** 
(0.010) 
[4.13] 
SELF t-1 (self employment)  0.20*** 
(0.013) 
[14.94] 
Constant  -18 
ECT t-1  -0.27* 
(0.16) 
[1.65] 
Adj R2  0.40 
Autocorrelation LM test  22.23 
Pvalue 0.9650 
White test  288.82 
Pvalue 0.5744 
Notes: All variables are in natural logarithm. The models are estimated with one cointegrating 
equation. Standard errors are in parentheses () and T-statistics in []. ***, **, * significant at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level. The autocorrelation LM test indicates that there is no residual serial 
autocorrelation since that the p-value is greater than 5%. Source: Own calculations  
 
After estimating the VEC currency demand model, we are able now to calculate 
the size of the shadow economy. The first step is to calculate currency demand in 
both formal and shadow economies Ĉ, then we set the tax burden, public-
employment and self-employment to the minimum level while keeping all else 
unchanged to estimate (Ć). The difference between Ĉ and Ć gives us the extra 
currency (EC) in the economy. Assuming equal income velocity of currency (V) in 
both the formal and the shadow economies (Tanzi, 1983), the size of the shadow 
economy is estimated by multiplying the EC with the velocity
xviii
.  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 =  𝐸𝐶 ∗ 𝑉       (5) 
 
Based on equation (5), we can then infer the size of the shadow economy in 
Egypt as a percentage of official GDP and approximate the evolution of the size of 
the shadow economy in Egypt from 1976 to 2013. 
It is important to note that the key assumption that the velocity is equal in both 
economies only holds when the coefficient of Y is equal to one (β=1). However, as 
being reported in Table-3, the coefficient of Y in our specification is different from 
one (β=1.46). As a result, we need to correct our results following the proposed 
method by Ahumada et al. (2007).  
 
β
1
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informalβ
1
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informal
formal
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Yˆ
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Y
       (6) 
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where Y and C are GDP and money, respectively, while β is the income 
elasticity. Based on this method, the estimates of the size of the shadow economy 
are corrected when β is not equal to 1. This correction method has been applied in 
recent studies including Macias & Cazzavillan (2009), Hernandez (2009) and 
Pickhardt & Sarda (2010; 2011). Based on this modified CDA, the size of the 
shadow economy in Egypt in % of GDP based on model (1) is shown in the 
following graph2.  
 
 
Graph 2. Size and development of the Egyptian shadow economy in % of GDP using CDA 
Source: Own calculations 
 
As can be seen from graph 2, the shadow economy in Egypt constituted a major 
portion of official GDP until the mid-1980s with a decreasing tendency. However, 
starting in the early 90s, it stabilizes on average between 20%-15% of GDP.  
 
3. Analysis and Implications 
As can be seen from the trend of the shadow economy in Egypt
xix
 in graph3, the 
largest size of the shadow economy based on the MIMIC and CDA models was 
evidenced at the beginning of the period under study reaching on average 33% and 
50% of GDP, respectively. This large value can be explained by the major 
recessions of the economy after the 1973-war with Israel. During the 70s (from 
1973 to 1978), the Egyptian economy was still suffering from the war time. The 
Egyptian government had focused on funding the military expenditure by 
purchasing weapons and rebuilding as well as improving the military infrastructure 
that was destroyed in the defeat of the 1967 war and also many Egyptians had left 
their employment positions in order to join the military and fight in the war. The 
Egyptian economy was burdened not only because of the shift of funding to the 
military but also due to the major economic losses during the war time that 
included losses in tourism revenues, losses in capital resources and Suez Canal 
revenues. Therefore, the government needed to undertake necessary policies to 
restore the military infrastructure and to find ways to fund its military spending. 
These policies included raising the direct and indirect tax revenues, with direct 
taxes increasing by 47% and indirect taxes increasing by 22% from 1970 until the 
early 1980s. Not only that, but also the central bank printed more money to raise 
funds to cover up military spending. As a result of these policies, the size of the 
shadow economy in Egypt during this war time and after the war reached its 
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highest share of GDP of the observed period; reaching on average more than 50% 
of GDP.   
During the 80s and 90s, the size of the shadow economy was fluctuating with a 
decreasing trend. This decreasing trend is attributed to the major reforms that were 
executed under the Mubarak regime (1981-2011). Mubarak launched the first five-
year plan of reforms in 1982. The aims of this five-year plan were to increase local 
industrial activity by imposing tariff barriers to protect domestic industries, lower 
interest rates on industrial loans and lower taxes on industrial projects. These 
policies helped the industrial sector to grow. Further down the road, in 1991, Egypt 
signed agreements with the IMF and the World Bank to receive external funding 
and aid. It is important to note that foreign aid resulted in economic growth in 
Egypt. Along with growth in industrialization and the manufacturing sector, the 
role of the dominating agricultural sector decreased over time. The role of the 
private sector increased due to an attempt to increase privatization of the state-
owned companies in order to strengthen industrialization. 
Not only that, but also the major drop in the size of the shadow economy 
starting 2005 is due to the major economic reforms that the Egyptian government 
executed in 2004/2005. These major economic reforms focused on improving the 
tax system in Egypt which resulted in initiating a new tax law. The goal of this tax 
reform was to simplify the tax law and to induce the same and equal tax burden for 
all businesses and economic units without any exceptions, tax holidays or special 
considerations in order to create a fair tax treatment for everyone as well as to 
encourage tax compliance. There was a media campaign by the end of 2004 to 
inform the public about the major changes and improvements and to create an 
environment of trust between the tax authority and the tax payer. In 2005, Law 
91/2005 was approved by the Egyptian parliament which put into action a 
reduction of tax rates, a clarification and simplification of the tax law and, most 
importantly, an improvement of the tax administration to be more transparent. One 
of the major benefits of this reform was the decrease in tax evasion as the 
government and the tax authority announced under the new law that there shall be a 
„forgiven act‟ for whoever was evading paying taxes, on the condition that they 
register themselves in the tax authority within a certain period of time which in 
return resulted in the formalization of many informal activities. Thus, the reduction 
in the tax rates along with the major improvements of the tax authority discouraged 
the public to evade taxes and engage in the shadow economy which can be seen in 
the reduction of the size of the shadow economy during this period and in the 
major increase in tax filings by 50%.   
Since the 2011 revolution, Egypt has been suffering from political and 
economic instability, thus we can conclude mixed results. At the year of the 
revolution, the size of the shadow economy was at its smallest (12% and 18% 
based on the CDA and MIMIC model, respectively) as the individuals were 
revolting for better economic performances and development. However, the years 
following the revolution suffered from the lowest official economic growth (1.7% 
growth in 2011 followed by a 2% growth in 2012) and many people have lost their 
jobs due to the contraction in the economy and due to political instability as many, 
especially international organizations, have closed and moved their operations 
elsewhere. Given increasing unemployment during those years (from 9% in 2010 
to 13.2% in 2013) and a contracting economy, many people were attracted to join 
the shadow economy as a safe harbor to earn income and to buy cheaper goods. As 
a result, the shadow economic activity rose in Egypt in the aftermath of the 
revolution reaching 21% of GDP.  
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Graph 3. A comparison of the size and development of the Egyptian shadow economy 
using the CDA and MIMIC model, 1976 to 2013 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Since the tax burden plays a significant role in influencing participation in the 
shadow economy, our recommendation is that policy makers should implement 
major tax reforms and introduce educational campaigns in order to improve tax 
compliance and increase tax morale. Egypt has the highest tax rate bracket on 
income (32-40%) compared to its neighboring MENA countries like Lebanon or 
Jordan (charging 15%). Not only that, Egypt suffers from a lack of trust between 
the tax payers and the tax authorities. As a result, a new major tax law reform was 
executed in 2005 to reduce tax rates and to clarify tax rules in order to increase tax 
payments and compliance. The outcome of this reform was an increase in tax 
filings by 50% which is also reflected in the downward trend in the size of the 
shadow economy after the reform was being introduced.  
Yet, it is important to highlight that the implementation of tax reforms should 
be accompanied by improvements in the quality of institutions. Thus, the dynamics 
of the tax burden with the quality of institutions should not be ignored by the 
officials. As concluded from the MIMIC findings, the quality of institutions 
significantly affects the peoples‟ perceptions and motivation to engage in informal 
activities. Therefore, we urge the policy makers to increase the quality of 
institutions by creating a democratic transparent environment and by reducing 
bureaucracy and over-regulation.  
For the case of Egypt, it is the first time to test for the quality of democratic 
institutions. Based on the MIMIC specification (4), the relative impact of 
democracy is 46%. Democracy has become an important issue for Egypt since the 
outbreak of the revolution in 2011, as one of the main goals of the revolution is to 
create a democratic environment. Not only that, but also democracy plays an 
important role affecting the citizens‟ motivation to participate in the shadow 
economy.  Firstly, in a democracy, there is an increased public participation. 
Democracy grants the public the right to be actively involved in the policy making 
process through their voting rights. For instance, if tax payers can vote on how 
taxes will be spent, then they will be less motivated to evade taxes by engaging in 
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the shadow economy. Democracy ensures that the public‟s opinions and priorities 
are heard and most importantly accounted for in the public policies.  Therefore, the 
implemented policies are efficient, reflect public preferences and lead to better 
public spending on goods and services. This democratic public involvement 
enhances trust between the government and the public and increases the publics‟ 
civic virtue and tax morality which in return reduces shadow economy 
participation. Secondly, democracy grants the public the „voice option‟ to be able 
to monitor and hold the government liable and accountable. This in return 
improves the legitimacy of the government through controlling the government‟s 
policies via referenda or threat of ballot. Also, the voice option reduces the policy-
makers‟ conflict of interest and rent-seeking activities which in return improves the 
public‟s perception of the government (Solomon & Schrestha, 2014; Teobaldelli & 
Schneider, 2013; Torgler & Schneider, 2007). As being shown in the MIMIC 
outcomes, we can conclude that democracy lowers the incentives of the individuals 
to participate in the shadow economy. Therefore, the government needs to improve 
its quality of institutions and to create a democratic and trustworthy environment 
between the government officials and the public in order to discourage people to 
engage in informal activities.   
In order to be able to determine the major factors that affect the development 
and size of the shadow economy in Egypt, the importance of the agricultural sector 
as measured by agricultural value-added as % of GDP should not be neglected. As 
per the findings, we can conclude that a large and dominating agricultural sector 
significantly affects the shadow economy in Egypt. The country‟s economic 
structure highly depends on the agricultural sector as a source of growth and 
support for other economic sectors. Figures show that total agricultural production 
increased by 20% during the last decades and employment in agriculture is larger 
compared to employment in the industrial sector. Due to the importance of the 
agricultural sector, the structural adjustment program in 1987 and the major policy 
reform in the 1990s focused on increasing agricultural production and income. 
Given the lack of proper education for Egypt‟s growing population and the 
concentration of households in rural areas, individuals highly depend on farming 
and agriculture-related activities as a source of income. Therefore, we can conclude 
that given the importance of the agricultural sector in Egypt and given its 
significant effect on the shadow economy, the government needs to efficiently 
formalize the agricultural sector by providing incentives for the public engaging in 
agricultural activities to discourage them from being informal.   
It is interesting to note that the unemployment rate has a negative effect on the 
size and development of the Egyptian shadow economy which is contrary to what 
we hypothesized. Such a behavior can be explained by the argument that job 
opportunities are also unavailable in the shadow economy in countries in which 
unemployment is steadily high. With reference to Egypt, the unemployment rate 
has been increasing steadily throughout the years from 1.6% in 1973 to 9% in 2000 
and to 13% in 2013. This shows that the overall economy has been contracting and 
in a recession, as being reflected by increasing unemployment, which makes it 
harder to find employment in both the formal and the informal economy. Also, this 
effect is reinforced by the study of Schneider et al. (2010) in which they concluded 
that high unemployment rates for the case of developing countries including Egypt 
do not necessarily lead to a larger size of the shadow economy. 
A final policy implication is based on the finding that the coefficient of the 
official economy and the shadow economy is negative. This draws our attention to 
the conclusion that when the official economy grows, then people are discouraged 
to undertake informal activities resulting in the efficiency of the market economy 
and in the formalization of the shadow economy.    
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4. Challenges to estimate the unobservable shadow 
economy 
It is important to note that there is no consensus in the literature on the best 
method to estimate the size of the shadow economy, therefore we apply two of the 
most widely used approaches to approximately estimate the size as well as the 
development of the shadow economy in Egypt by using both the CDA and MIMIC 
model to capture the dynamics of the complex nature of the shadow economy.  
Although the CDA is one of the mostly used methods
xx
 to estimate the size of the 
shadow economy, it has been subject to major criticisms:  
(1)  The main assumption of the method is that all transactions are conducted in 
cash to avoid traceability. However, not all informal transactions are made in cash.  
(2)  The method ignores the possibility of a barter shadow economy leading to 
the undervaluation of the total size of the shadow economy. Based on their survey, 
Isachsen and Strom (1985) concluded that approximately 80% of the informal 
activities in Norway were conducted in cash. 
(3)  The assumption of no shadow economy in a base year is highly criticized.  
(4)  The assumption of the equal velocity of money in both the formal and the 
shadow economies is among the highlighted limitations of the CDA.  
(5)  Another important criticism is that most of the CDA models consider only 
one variable, which is the tax burden (Schneider, 1986). Moreover, the CDA 
considers only one indicator, hence currency, to reflect the shadow economic 
activities.  
Quite often the MIMIC model is considered superior to the CDA because the 
MIMIC model allows the researcher to consider several causes and indicators at the 
same time to model the evolution of the shadow economy over time.   But like any 
other econometric model, the MIMIC model face some limitations:  
(1) The application of the MIMIC model to small sample sizes and time series 
analysis due to non-stationarity and non-normality of the time series.  
(2) The choice of the observed variables to be a causal or an indicator variable. 
For instance, unemployment rate can be regarded as a causal variable leading to the 
development of the shadow economy. At the same time, unemployment rate can be 
regarded as an effect of the existence of the shadow economy in a certain country.  
(3) Since that the shadow economy is a latent variable, it is challenging when 
it comes to defining the shadow economy and to make sure that the shadow 
economy defined is the one being measured by the MIMIC model and not a similar 
variable. In order to address these limitations (2) and (3), the researcher needs to 
firstly clearly provide a detailed and well-explained theoretical background of 
choosing the observed variables as causal and indicator variables as well as to 
provide a clear cut definition of the shadow economy that the researcher is 
intending to measure by the MIMIC model. 
(4) Another complexity of the MIMIC model is that it only provides an index 
of the size of the shadow economy, therefore an additional step is needed to be 
conducted to convert this index to actual values of the shadow economy as % of 
GDP (Dell‟Anno, 2007; Dell‟Anno & Schneider, 2009; Schneider & Williams, 
2013).  
Since each method has its own strengths and weaknesses and since the shadow 
economy is by nature untraceable, the estimates of the shadow economy should be 
interpreted as an approximation of the size of the shadow economy, rather than 
being exact measures. We gain information from the methods on the most 
important factors that influence the proliferation of the shadow economy and about 
the trend and development of the shadow economy in Egypt. 
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In conclusion, there is no best or commonly accepted method to estimate the 
size of the shadow economy. Although that each method has its own limitations, 
the MIMIC model provides the most extensive reflection of the development of the 
size of the shadow economy over time while considering various causes and 
indicators and has been widely used in the last few decades. It is important to 
acknowledge that there is no exact measure of the shadow economy, in all the 
cases, we intend to measure economic activities that are, by nature, unrecorded.    
 
5. Conclusion 
Both methods; CDA and MIMIC models, came to the same conclusion that the 
shadow economy accounts for a major proportion of the official economy, yet it 
has a decreasing trend over time. Our MIMIC results show that the shadow 
economy in Egypt accounted for more than 35% of GDP by the start of our study 
(1976) and decreased to 23% of GDP in 2013. As can be seen from Table-4, all of 
our hypotheses have been confirmed by both the MIMIC and CDA, except for the 
impact of unemployment on the shadow economy in Egypt. It can be concluded 
that a high level of unemployment in Egypt does not necessarily lead to a larger 
size of the shadow economy.  
 
Table 4.Empirical confirmation of our hypotheses 
Variables (Hypothesized sign) Method(s) Result 
(1) Total tax burden (+) MIMIC 
CDA 
Both Confirmed 
(2) Quality of democratic institutions (-) MIMIC Confirmed 
(3) Size of agricultural sector(+) MIMIC Confirmed 
(4) Self-employment (+) MIMIC 
CDA 
Both Confirmed 
(5) Regulation (+) CDA Confirmed 
(6) Unemployment (+) MIMIC Negative insignificant 
(7) Official GDP (-) MIMIC Confirmed 
(8) Currency (+) MIMIC Confirmed 
(9) Total employment (-) MIMIC Confirmed 
Notes: Source: Authors 
 
Our study provides an example of the evolution of the shadow economy in a 
developing country focusing on the case of Egypt. Our first conclusion is that the 
shadow economy has a decreasing trend, yet it accounts for a large portion of GDP. 
Secondly, the stagnation of the shadow economy at a high proportion of GDP 
during the last decade reflects the failure of public policies to tackle the shadow 
economy and to drive economic growth. Thirdly, Egypt is a labor-abundant 
country with an increasing population of 88 million inhabitants and a 610 billion 
Egyptian Pounds worth of GDP in 2013. The forth conclusion is that the shadow 
economy accounts for a huge weight on the official economy leading to some 
negative externalities and thus deterring the development of the country. However, 
for the case of a developing country like Egypt, the shadow economy is not 
necessarily seen as a foe to the formal economy. The shadow economy creates 
stimulating effects because the income earned informally is later spent in the 
formal economy. Also, the shadow economy adds to the dynamics of the formal 
economy by creating markets that otherwise would not be possible such as small 
scale production and services. Additionally, the shadow economy can act as an 
employer of last resort where people find job opportunities not otherwise possible, 
for example during recessions and crises. The shadow economy in Egypt acted like 
a sponge absorbing all the people that were laid off as a result of the economic and 
political instability that happened in Egypt after the 2011 revolution.    
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(2), M. Hassan, & F. Schneider, p.309-339. 
329 
329 
The big challenge for policy makers is to know to what extent they should 
tackle the shadow economy. It is interesting to note that to some extent the shadow 
economy is “good” for a developing economy and that the shadow economy 
provides stability. The Arab Spring movement that started in 2011 was triggered by 
an informal street vendor who set himself on fire because the police officers 
detained him from performing his informal activities. From our results, the policy 
makers can identify the major factors that influence peoples‟ incentives to 
participate in the shadow economy in order to be able to correctly channel their 
policies and reforms and formalize the shadow economy. Most importantly, policy 
makers need to focus on the quality of institutions by creating democratic and 
transparent institutions with lower regulatory burden, corruption and bureaucracy 
in order to be able to restore the trust and confidence of the economic agents in the 
overall system of the country and to be able to have effective strategies to reduce 
the Egyptian shadow economy.  
We finally recommend that a future line of research should analyze the 
Egyptian shadow economy from a micro-level approach such as conducting direct 
surveys in order to provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the shadow 
economy, the profile of the participants and their motivations.      
 
Notes 
 
i Egypt continually suffers from an inefficient state control, a dominant public sector, rising debt 
levels and a stagnant private sector.   
iiA brief description is given in the appendix (A1). 
iii For the theoretical explanation of the variable, refer to sections (2.2.2 and 2.2.3) 
iv For a brief description of the MIMIC model specification, we refer to the appendix (A1.2) 
v The Benchmarking step is explained in detail in section A1.3 in the Appendix 
viTo mention a few, Alanon & Go‟mez-Antonio (2005), Dell‟Anno et al. (2007), Tedds (2005), 
Schneider et al. (2010), Buehn & Schneider (2008) and Loayza (1996). 
vii A detailed explanation of the variables is provided in the appendix table (A.3). 
viii The Augmented Dicky Fuller unit root test is provided in the appendix table (A.1) 
ix Three of the multivariate normality tests reject Ho (multivariate normality) at the 5% significance 
level. 
xThe chi-square fit statistic will tend to over-reject correctly specified models in case the ratio of the 
sample size to the number of the parameters is relatively small. Also, multivariate normality is an 
underlying assumption in the chi-square test (Kline, 2011).  
xi Details of the specifications and the outcomes are provided in Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix 
xiiThe calibrated values of the size of the shadow economy are provided in the appendix table (A.7). 
For the starting values of the calibration procedure we used our estimates from the CDA approach 
for the year 2013. 
xiii See also Tanzi (1983) being the first, Schneider (1986), Schneider & Enste (2000), Caridi & 
Passerini (2001), Bajada & Schneider (2005), Alm & Embaye (2013) and Ardizzi et al. (2014). 
xiv A detailed explanation of the variables is provided in the appendix table (A.4). 
xv Some theoretical considerations about the causal variables of the shadow economy are in section 
2.1.1. 
xvi For example, in Tunisia or Israel, one must go through 9 or 5 procedures and wait 41 or 32 days, 
respectively. 
xvii See appendix table (A.2). These tests were run by Eviews 8. 
xviiiThe income velocity of currency is extracted from the economic bulletin published by the Central 
Bank of Egypt.  
xix Both the CDA and the MIMIC model show a downward trend of the development of the Egyptian 
shadow economy. The correlation coefficient between the two series is highly significant at 0.7235 
(0.0000). 
xxSee also Tanzi (1983) being the first, Schneider (1986), Schneider & Enste (2000), Caridi & 
Passerini (2001), Bajada & Schneider (2005), Alm & Embaye (2013) and Ardizzi et al. (2014). 
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Appendices 
A1. Measuring the shadow economy 
A1.1 General Remarks 
There are various ways to estimate the size of the shadow economy for a certain 
country. These methods include the direct method, indirect method and the model 
approach. The direct method which is also called the microeconomic approach helps to 
gather first-hand data about the shadow economy by having contacts with or observations 
of individuals or firms. This approach is used extensively by various scholars such as 
Isachsen & Strom (1985), Gёrxhani & Van De Werfhorst (2013) or Williams (2006) to 
understand intensely the nature of the shadow economy. Examples of the direct method are 
well-designed and sampled surveys as well as auditing of tax returns and other compliance 
methods. The limitation of this direct method is the cooperation and response of the 
representatives questioned in the sample. In the case of carrying out direct questionnaires, 
there is high chance that the respondents are reluctant to answer questions related to 
informal work and income. Although, the direct method provides detailed information 
about the structure and composition of the shadow economy in a certain country but their 
major disadvantage is that they do not reflect all the shadow economic activities and that 
they result in only point-time estimates of the size of the shadow economy. The direct 
methods are unable to estimate the development and growth of the shadow economy over a 
long period of time and are lower-bound estimates for the true size of the shadow economy 
(Schneider & Enste, 2013; Dell‟Anno et al., 2007).  
The second approach to measure the size of the shadow economy is indirect; mostly 
referred to as the „indicator‟ approach. Indirect methods are macroeconomic approaches 
capturing the traces that the shadow economy leaves in the official statistics as information 
on the size of the shadow economy. The major criticism is that they only consider one 
aspect that is supposed to capture all the effects and the complexity of the shadow 
economy. The four main indirect methods
xx
 are  
1. The discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics. 
2. The discrepancy between official and actual labor force. 
3. The monetary methods: CDA.  
4. The physical input (electrical energy consumption) method.  
The last method to estimate the shadow economy is called the statistical model or 
Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause (MIMIC)
xx
 which will be discussed in detail in the 
following sections. The MIMIC model is a particular type of structural equation modeling 
which is commonly applied in social science research such as in psychology or sociology. 
The model is based on the statistical theory of „unobserved‟ variables developed by Zellner 
(1970) and Joreskog & Goldberger (1975). The pioneers to apply the MIMIC model in their 
estimation of the shadow economy as a latent variable were Frey & Week-Hannemann 
(1984) to measure the size of the hidden economy for OECD countries from 1960 to 1973. 
Following them, various scholars including but not limited to Tafenau et al. (2010); Tedds 
(2005); Schneider et al. (2010); Dell‟Anno (2006); Buehn & Farzanegan (2012), 
Farzanegan (2009); Chaudhuri et al. (2006) have also applied this model approach in the 
estimation of the informal economy.     
A1.2. MIMIC Model Specification 
The MIMIC model is superior to the other methods because various observable and 
measurable causes and indicators are considered at the same time regarding this complex 
and unrecorded nature of the shadow economy. 
The MIMIC model estimates the relationship between observable variables and a latent 
variable (shadow economy) by reducing the distance between the sample covariance matrix 
Ѕ and the covariance matrix ∑ (θ) predicted by the model.  
Both the structural disturbance term 𝜍  and the measurement error term 𝜀𝑝  are 
independent and are assumed to follow a standard normal distribution with a mean of zero 
and constant variance (Dell‟Anno & Schneider, 2009). 
The most widely used estimation method for the MIMIC model is the Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) estimation.  ML estimation a) measures how close is the population 
covariance matrix to the sample covariance matrix and b) finds the values of the parameters 
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that produce the population covariance matrix that is as close as possible to the sample 
covariance matrix. Our aim is to minimize the distance between the population covariance 
matrix and the sample covariance matrix in order to reach a perfect fit of the model 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2010). There are four important assumptions that need to be met 
when estimating the MIMIC model: 
1. The variables must be multi-normally distributedxx.  
2. The variables must have a linear relationship. 
3. The distribution of the residuals must be homoscedastic. 
4. Large sample sizes. The sample size should not be less than 50. 
In addition, one must test whether the time-series is stationary or not. A further step 
based on the outcome of the unit root test, one must test whether the variables (both the 
causes and the indicators) are co-integrated or not. 
The chosen MIMIC model is based on several model fit characteristics. It is important 
to note that we should not depend solely on the chi-square fit statistic when evaluating the 
model fit because it is very sensitive to sample size and the multivariate normality 
assumption (Singh, 2009, Iacobucci, 2010). In addition to the chi-square statistic, we 
observe the (adjusted) goodness of fit index and other fit indexes that are based on the 
covariance residuals including the CD, CFI and standardized RMR (SRMR). The SRMR is 
a good evaluation of whether the researcher‟s model captures the data because it is not 
much sensitive to violation of distribution assumptions (Iacobucci, 2010). There is an 
agreement in the literature that ideally, the researchers report the chi-square statistic along 
with the degrees of freedom, CFI and the SRMR (Iacobucci, 2010). For a perfect model fit, 
the chi-square needs to be insignificant (p>0.05), the GFI to be closer to 1, the CFI closer to 
0.95 and the SRMR closer to 0.09 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Other fit statistics to evaluate the 
model include the RMSEA. RMSEA is a popular statistic to evaluate the model fit where a 
value of zero indicators a perfect fit, yet it is not preferable in case of small sample sizes; 
i.e. N≤200 (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Given the technicality of the RMSEA calculation, the 
model degrees of freedom and one less than the sample size are in the denominator, 
therefore the RMSEA value decreases as the sample size increases showing how the 
RMSEA is influenced by the sample size due to the fact that small sized samples have few 
degrees of freedom which in return intensifies the RMSEA (Kline, 2011).  
A1.3. Benchmarking procedure 
Notably, the MIMIC model provides an estimation of a relative evolution of the size of 
the shadow economy over time; meaning that it only yields ordinal estimates of the size of 
the shadow economy. Thus, an additional final step is required to calculate the size of the 
shadow economy in a meaningful way, hence as percentage of GDP. This last step is called 
a benchmarking step or procedure. In the literature, there is a wide discussion of the 
different benchmarking procedures to be applied, but there is no agreement on which 
procedure is superior to the other
xx
. The following benchmarking procedure
xx
 is applied to 
calibrate the ordinal estimates into cardinal values and convert this index to % units (real 
values). This requires that a prior estimation of the Egyptian shadow economy to be 
computed. Thus, the exogenous estimation of the relative size of the shadow economy in 
Egypt used to calibrate the ordinal values is based on our currency demand approach (1976-
2013) in the current study.   
 
ɳt =
ῆ𝑡
ῆ𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
ɳ ∗ 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟       (1) 
 
where ῆ𝑡 denotes the value of the MIMIC index at time t according to the structural 
equation (1), ῆ𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 is the value of the MIMIC index in the base year which is in our 
model is 2013, ɳ ∗ 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 is the exogenous (prior) estimation of the size of the shadow 
economy in Egypt in the base year (=2013) reaching 21.43% of GDP extracted from our 
CDA results.   
Based on the application of this benchmarking procedure, we are able to calculate the 
final estimates of the size of the shadow economy as percentage of GDP for the given 
period of our study and to reach a trend of the development of the shadow economy in 
Egypt from 1976 to 2013.  
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(2), M. Hassan, & F. Schneider, p.309-339. 
332 
332 
 
 
 
Graph A.1. Hypothesized MIMIC path 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1. ADF Unit root test for MIMIC variables 
Variables At level First difference 
 Intercept Trend and 
Intercept 
No Trend and 
NoIntercept 
Intercept Trend and 
Intercept 
No Trend and 
No Intercept 
Total_taxes% GDP -1.30 -2.19 0.59 -5.08*** -5.11*** -5.14*** 
Institutional Quality -1.41 -2.06 -1.14 -5.95*** -5.85*** -5.92*** 
Agriculture-
valueadded% GDP 
-3.04** -2.28 -3.14*** -4.47*** -4.90*** -4.08*** 
Unemployment rate -1.28 -2.23 1.46 -5.59*** -5.52*** -5.21*** 
Self-Employment 
%LF 
-1.93 -2.35 -1.48 -8.90*** -9.18*** -8.80*** 
Real GDP index 2.88 -0.85 3.25 -2.82* -3.41* -1.03 
Money growth% -2.56 -3.83** -1.12 -9.12*** -9.01*** -9.22*** 
Total emplyoment 
%population 
-1.45 -1.83 0.68 -5.14*** -5.09*** -5.16*** 
Notes:Reported above are the T-statistics for the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test. Null 
hypothesis: variable has unit root. The lag length was chosen using the Schwarz Information 
Criterion. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,5% and 1% respectively. Source: Own calculations 
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Table A.2. ADF Unit root test for CDA variables 
Variables At level First difference 
 Intercept Trend and 
Intercept 
No Trend and 
NoIntercept 
Intercept Trend and 
Intercept 
No Trend and 
No Intercept 
C -0.07 -0.65 1.44 -3.44** -3.47* -3.07*** 
Y -3.31** -2.85 12.76 -5.17*** -5.49*** -2.37** 
TAX -0.98 -2.14 -0.65 -4.45*** -4.48*** -4.48*** 
R -1.57 -2.74 -0.29 -4.85*** -4.40*** -5.08*** 
REG -1.48 0.40 -0.02 -3.74*** -4.72*** -3.84*** 
SELF -2.08 -1.39 -1.58 -7.93*** -8.44*** -7.80*** 
GOV -3.07** -2.27 -1.85* -7.21*** -7.46*** -3.55*** 
Notes: Reported above are the T-statistics for the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test. Null 
hypothesis: variable has unit root. The lag length was chosen using the Schwarz Information 
Criterion. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%,5% and 1% respectively. Source: Own 
calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.3.Variables in the MIMIC model 
Variables Source Definition 
Total taxes in absolute 
values in local currency 
The series is extracted from 
the yearly economic bulletin 
published by the   National 
Bank of Egypt 
The total taxes are the total sum in local currency 
imposed on income, profit and sales.  The burden 
is calculated as % of GDP. 
Institutional quality of 
democratic institutions 
(PolityIV index) 
Polity IV project The scale ranges from -10 to +10, indicating the 
extent of autocratic to democratic institutions in a 
country. Hence, the higher the index, the better. 
Unemployment_rate (15+) International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) 
The unemployment rate is the number of persons 
who are unemployed as a percent of the total 
number of employed and unemployed persons (i.e., 
the labour force). 
Agriculture value-added as 
% of GDP 
World Bank Indicators Agriculture value-added is the net output of the 
sector calculated as % of GDP. 
Self-Employment rate CAPMAS Labor Sample 
Survey 
An individual who depends on himself solely to 
perform private business and who does not employ 
anyone (with salary or without). The rate is 
calculated as % of total labour force 
Real GDP Index World Bank Indicators Index of real GDP, base year 2005=100 
Money growth (annual %) World Bank Indicators Average annual growth rate in money. Money is 
the sum of currency outside banks and demand 
deposits.  
Total Employment rate CAPMAS Labor Sample 
Survey 
The total number of people who are formally 
employed by possessing a formal contract.  The 
rate is calculated as % of total population. 
Source: Authors 
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Table A.4.Variables used in the CDA 
Variables Source Definition 
Currency in Circulation (Ct) The series is extracted 
from the yearly 
economic bulletin 
published by the 
Central Bank of Egypt 
The sum of currency outside banks normalized by GDP 
deflator.  
Real income (GDP) (Yt) World Bank Indicators GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. GDP per capita is 
gross domestic product divided by midyear population. 
Total tax burden (TAXt) The series is extracted 
from the yearly 
economic bulletin 
published by the 
National Bank of 
Egypt 
The total taxes are the total sum in local currency 
imposed on income, profit and sales. Total Tax burden 
is defined as % of GDP. 
Public employment as % of 
labor force (REGt) 
CAPMAS Labor 
Sample Survey 
Those who are employed, in the work force, receive a 
salary and characterized according to the type of sector 
they are working at. Hence, the public sector.  It is 
calculated as a ration to total labour force. 
Self-Employment rate 
(SELFt) 
CAPMAS Labor 
Sample Survey 
An individual who depends on himself solely to 
perform private business and who does not employ 
anyone (with salary or without). The rat is as % of total 
labour force 
Nominal Deposit Interest 
rate (Rt)  
World Bank Indicators Deposit interest rate is the rate paid by commercial or 
similar banks for demand, time, or savings deposits. 
Source: Authors 
 
 
 
Table A.5.Fixing reference variable (Real GDP index) to +1 
Variables/specifications MIMIC1  
5-1-3 
MIMIC2 
4-1-3 
MIMIC3 
4-1-3 
MIMIC4 
3-1-3 
Causes     
Total Tax Burden 
 
-0.26*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.29*** 
(-6.38) 
-0.28*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.33*** 
(-8.54) 
Institutional Quality 0.48*** 
(9.01) 
0.46*** 
(9.34) 
0.48*** 
(8.94) 
0.46*** 
(9.29) 
Agriculture Importance 
 
-0.26* 
(-1.75) 
-0.35*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.33*** 
(-2.44) 
-0.46*** 
(-7.48) 
Unemployment Rate  
 
0.10 
 (0.70) 
0.13 
(0.94) 
  
Self Employment -0.15 
(-1.07) 
 -0.17 
(-1.17) 
 
Indicators     
Real GDP Index +1 +1 +1 +1 
Money 
 
-0.66*** 
(-13.01) 
-0.65*** 
(-11.38) 
-0.67*** 
(-13.43) 
-0.65*** 
(-11.65) 
Total Employment 0.86*** 
(14.28) 
0.81*** 
(14.51) 
0.82*** 
(14.27) 
0.82*** 
(14.54) 
Statistical tests     
Chi2 
Pvalue 
25.98 
(0.0038) 
14.63 
(0.0668) 
22.93 
(0.0035) 
11.55 
(0.0728) 
Swain corrected chi2 
Pvalue 
 
27.19 
(0.0024) 
 
16.39 
(0.0371) 
 
25.59 
(0.0012) 
 
14.75 
(0.0223) 
 
Source: Authors 
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Table A.6.Relaxing the reference variable (Real GDP index) and fixing money_growth to 
+1 
Variables/specifications MIMIC1  
5-1-3 
MIMIC2 
4-1-3 
MIMIC3 
4-1-3 
MIMIC4 
3-1-3 
Causes     
Total Tax Burden 
 
0.26*** 
(3.99) 
0.29*** 
(6.38) 
0.28*** 
(3.76) 
0.33*** 
(8.54) 
Institutional Quality -0.48*** 
(-9.01) 
-0.46*** 
(-9.34) 
-0.48*** 
(-8.94) 
-0.46*** 
(-9.29) 
Agriculture Importance 
 
0.26* 
(1.75) 
0.35*** 
(2.67) 
0.33*** 
(2.44) 
0.46*** 
(7.48) 
Unemployment Rate  
 
-0.10 
 (-0.70) 
-0.13 
(-0.94) 
  
Self-Employment 0.15 
(1.07) 
 0.17 
(1.17) 
 
Indicators     
Real GDP Index -0.97 -0.97 -0.96 -0.97 
Money 
 
+1 +1 +1 +1 
Total Employment -0.82*** 
(-14.28) 
-0.81*** 
(-14.51) 
-0.82*** 
(-14.27) 
-0.82*** 
(-14.54) 
Statistical tests     
Chi2 
Pvalue 
25.98 
(0.0038) 
14.63 
(0.0668) 
22.93 
(0.0035) 
11.55 
(0.0728) 
Swain corrected chi2 
Pvalue 
27.19 
(0.0024) 
 
16.39 
(0.0371) 
 
25.59 
(0.0012) 
 
14.75 
(0.0223) 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 3(2), M. Hassan, & F. Schneider, p.309-339. 
336 
336 
 
Table A.7. Size of the Egyptian shadow economy as % of GDP (1976-2013) 
Year SE_CDA SE_MIMIC 
1976 59.02 35.00 
1977 49.05 34.36 
1978 48.41 33.89 
1979 47.10 31.49 
1980 45.54 32.62 
1981 36.31 36.36 
1982 38.74 34.71 
1983 35.21 34.80 
1984 36.34 34.26 
1985 31.24 32.16 
1986 23.27 32.30 
1987 21.63 31.01 
1988 21.89 29.81 
1989 21.71 29.92 
1990 12.07 29.43 
1991 13.25 29.86 
1992 11.89 28.98 
1993 19.04 28.10 
1994 13.97 27.93 
1995 13.59 27.64 
1996 13.92 27.53 
1997 15.21 26.97 
1998 15.93 28.00 
1999 13.30 28.10 
2000 12.32 27.33 
2001 10.69 26.93 
2002 18.96 27.20 
2003 11.76 27.13 
2004 12.44 26.25 
2005 13.77 21.47 
2006 12.07 21.17 
2007 20.19 21.18 
2008 10.46 20.69 
2009 9.29 19.91 
2010 14.26 19.97 
2011 11.69 17.94 
2012 11.19 20.05 
2013 21.43 21.43 
 
  
Source: Own calculations 
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